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Abstract 
As many researchers have concluded foreign aid is a necessary but an 
insufficient factor towards development， which has var匂deffects on differ-
ent context of a developing巴conomy.1n the political context， for巴ignaid 
plays a significant role in Sri Lanka. Th巴 receiptsof foreign aid have 
varied significantly， with resp巴ctto policy changes in the country from 
independence. Yet， so far it has not made any significant effect on日co-
nomic performance of the country. It has a positive effected in the GDP 
growth rate， but not suffici巴ntto disburse the cost of financ巴.It has caused 
an increase in government consumption exp巴nditureand a reduction in 
domestic savings rates. Moreover， the country's debt burden has risen 
significantly. 
I. Introduction 
The process of development is an extremely multifaceted historical 
process， which could be influenced by many factors， some possibly stil 
faceless. Therefore， Official Development Assistance (ODA) 1 or more 
* This paper is written by Hansamali Pitigala under my guidence 
1 Grants or Loans to countries and territories which are: (a) undertaken by th巴
official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and w巴lfareas the 
main objective; (c) at conc巴ssionalfinancial terms [if a loan， having a Grant 
Element of at least 25 per cent]. 1n addition to financial flows， Technical Co 
-operation is included in aid. Grants， Loans and credits for military purposes arで
excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (巴.g.pensions， reparations or 
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generally， fOl・eignaid is only one source for promoting economic growth 
and development. However， many developement economists， policy 
makers and mutinational development institutions has been optimistic 
about the transfer of foreign resources from developed countries to 
developing countries as a principal strategy to promote growth and 
development. Foreign aid is assumed to facilitate recipient countries to 
realize their short and long run economic growth and development aims. 
However， the experience of foreign aid uitlization in many developing 
economies has not achieved its expectations. After nearly half a century 
of foreign aid， the purpose and worth of that spending is stil an issue of 
debate. Determining what role， ifany， foreign aid has played in the 
development process of the recipient countr允sis difficult. It is only one 
factor， whereas many other economic and socio-cultural factors plays a 
more significant role on development.註ence，the relationship between 
foreign aid， or so called ODA， and growth remains controversial. 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the macro-level 
contribution of foreign aid in the post war development process in Sri 
Lanka. First， itanalyses the theoritical background on the relationship 
of foreign aid and development. Second， itattempts to review the status 
of aid in the socio…economic context of Sri Lanka. Finally， the effects so 
far， of foreign aid on some selected macroeconomic variables of the 
economy of Sri Lanka are assessed. 
insurance payouts) are in general not counted. (www.OECD.OI又).But Krueger et 
al (1989: 32) has included in his dfinition th巴nearmarket term loans provided by 
multilateral development institutions (N on-concessional Multilat巴ralFlows). This 
includes lending by the W orld Bank and the hard windows of th巴regionaldevelop. 
m巴，ntbanks and“limit巴dmemb巴rship"multilat巴ral
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I. Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: An Overview 
Harrod-Domar modeF provides a foundation for many theories 
developed on the relationship between foreign aid and development. At 
the basis of the Harrod-Domar model the consumption level was consid-
ered not to infIuence the growth leveI. This lead to the establishing of a 
direct relationship between the investments level and the country's rate of 
growth， which was expressed by the Incremental Capital-Output Ratio 
(ん).An amount of external financing， such as foreign aid， woulcl increase 
the capital stock permiting the Developing Countries to increase the rate 
of growth beyond the sustenance level， thus permitting to increase interぉ
nal savings， starting up a virtuous circIe of development. Under the 
assumption that domestic resources mobilization improves with per 
capita income， foreign aid is self-limiting. The only requirement is that 
it raises current incomes. As the clomestic savings rate of GNP， exports 
ancl tax revenue rise with per capita GNP， the neecl for aicl clisappears. 
The story seεms to fit well with exper匂ncewith Botswana ancl the 
republic of Korea， where very high aid levels gave way determinately to 
rapicl growth ancl“graduation" (Azam et aI.， 2004: 1) from the depen-
clence of foreign aicl. 
The motive of foreign finance is further illustrated in the two-gap 
modeJ3 developed by Chenery ancl Bruno in 1962 ancl improvecl in 1966 by 
2 clY/Y立l/k.(clK/Y);wh巴reclY /Y represents the GDP rate of growth; k isth巴
Increl11巴ntalC日pitaI/OutputRatio; clK is the Capital stock growth (i.巴.net invest司
m巴nt); ancl Y is the GDP. 
3 Starting with th巴identityof Capital infIo¥V (the clifferences b巴tweenimports ancl 
exports) add to investible resourc巴s(domestic savings). The savings-investm巴nt
Iεstriction caηb巴巴xpressedas; I<F+sY: F isforeign capital flow， sY is domestic 
savings and 1 isinvestm巴nts.If LDCs investment has a marginal import shar巴ofm"
ancl marginal propensity to import out of a unit of GNP of m2， foreign exchange 
constrain is; (111，-m2) 1十1112Y -E.:S;F， E isexogenous exports leveI. If F， E and Y are 
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Chenery and Strout (Taylor， 1994: 18). 1n this theory， labor is a free good. 
With growth of the economy， apart from the capital requirement， imports 
are considered necessary in fixed proportion for both investment and 
output of input substitution industries. The newly established industries 
will be unable to function without the intermediate inputs and raw 
materials required， which are not produced locally or which the country 
do not possess the comparative advantage in producing them. 1n the two 
…gap model， export growth is taken as exogenous at a predetermined 
rate， and domestic savings rate was taken as given. An increase in the 
output could come about only with new capital and imports. Thus， a gap 
exists between domestic savings and investment， or between forモign
exchange demand and supply. At early stages of development， foreign 
exchange， rather than savings was speculated to be the binding con-
straint. At this point of view， foreign aid can play a vital role in filling 
up this gap. If the productivity is assumed to be constant， the amount of 
aid needed to achieve specific economic growth can be speculated. The 
larger of the two gaps is the amount of foreign aid needed by the economy 
to achieve the particular growth rate. Foreign aid will fil the two gaps 
at once in view of the fact that; the provided aid can be used to fi1l the 
foreign exchange deficit and can be used to enhance domestic savings 
directly 
Taylor (1993: 19)， has attempted to improve the two gap model in to 
a three gap model highlighting the fact that fiscal and foreign transfer 
limitations can become a crucial factor on policy choices for many 
growing economies. The existence of a fiscal deficit4 can adversely effect 
considered exogenous and given， only 1 wil be binding in on巴ofth巴in日qualities
(Todaro， 202: 655) 
4 The public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) or fiscal deficit can be shown 
by funds requir巴dby the governm巴ntin order to pay for its exp巴nditur巴andfurth巴r
investment， minus n巴ttaxes and other r巴venu巴s.
??
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the inflation or the public debt-output ratio of a country. Regarding the 
fact that appropriate types of public investment can result a crowding in 
effect of private investments， the model developed by Heller in 1975 
(extracted from Khan 1998: 4) illustrates the relationship between foreign 
aid and pulコlicinvestment， more generally， development expenditure. 
On the other hand， Keith Griffin (1970: 109) argued that the country 
would treat aid inflow as an increase in total income and allocate between 
savings and consumptions following the marginal propensity to save. 
This growth woulc1 reveal to be much less if comparec1 to the calculation 
of the Chener・y-Stroutmoc1el. Although the Harr‘oc1…Domar moc1el claims 
that the governments would use the increase in fiscal income to increase 
investment， this approach sustainec1 the idea that governments would 
spenc1 this increasec1 incol11e in consumption rather than in investments. 
Complementing this l110del， Khan (1998: 5) attemptec1 to model the role of 
foreign aic1 taking into account institutional variations anc1 bounc1ed 
rationality of policymakers in recipient countries. 
When rewieving these theoretical approaches， the role of the govern司
ment in utilization of foreign aic1 for c1evelopment， isemphasisec1 signifi田
cantly. 1n the early days of c1evelopment assistance， the c10mestic markets 
of developing countries where presumed to be non-existent or incapable 
of promoting growth. Thus， the new governments， specially after in叩
dependence of western colonial powers， where regardec1 as mec1iators of 
political， social and economic change. 1n this respect， government to 
government aic1 was clail11ed as the best way to promote development. 
But this optimistic view was scatterec1 after five decades of foreign 
assistance， with only a hanc1 ful of positive results to show for its effort. 
Hence in more recent evaluations， failures of the governments to govern 
effectively were highlighted. Thus， the need to highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of both market anc1 governments are neec1ed to be ic1entified 
as a key factor. The evolution of the theory of foreign aic1 and c1evelop-
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ment has come to app1'eciate the fact that the inc1'emental income result-
ing f1'om fo1'eign aid does not nesseca1'ily lead to an inc1'ease in invest-
ments 01' savings. It can as well lead to an increase in consumption， 
winding up with a less than expected contribution to development. 
Within this theOl社icalbackground， the empirical literature evaluat-
ing the role of foreign aid in development at the macro level is inconclu司
sive. 1n general， itwas argued that foreign aid can facilitate development， 
within the context of a policy environment conducive for growth. Heller 
(1975 extracted from http:/www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm) concluded that a 
positive and significant relationship exist between aid and investment. 1n 
contrast， Griffin and Enos (1970: 318)， Weisskopf (1972: 25)， Papernek， 
(1975: 934…950 extracted from Krueger et al.， 1989: 115-120) has conclud-
ed that aid receipts has a significantly negative impact on domestic 
savings. Alesina & Dollar (1998: 3) argues that foreign aid crowds out 
domestic private savings and promotes public consumption and that it has 
no substantial outcome on the macroeconomy of the recipient country. 
Mosley (1987: chapter 7 extracted from http:/www.cbo.gov/showc1oc. 
cfm) concluc1ed that no significant corelation exist between aic1 and 
growth once factors such as private capital flow and domestic savings are 
taken into account. Simila1'ly， Boone (1996: 289) noted that there is no 
siginficant corelation between aid and growth and al aid goes to con-
sumption. Most of the above stuc1ies are cross country assessments， 
considering devloping or ODA recipient countries as a whole for the 
c1enominator， thus the conclusions a1'e generalized for al LDCs. Hence， 
sample variations may have lec1 for different conclutions. 
These studies reveal that the pe1'formance of foreign aid varies 
significantly depending on the context considered. One shoulc1 be cautious 
when taking the negetive relationships in their face values. Apart fr・0111
the poor performances of foreign aid， itmay also imply that foreign aid 
is attracted by poorly performing economies. Kruger et al. (1989: 115) 
? ?
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argues that these invers-relationships of foreign aid and savings rate or 
growth rate reflect simply the donor decision to assist moreてneedy'
countries with pOO1‘ economic performances. The diversity in perfor-
mances signifies that the performance of foreign aid in the process of 
development depencls on the economy it is expected to perforl11. The 
effectiveness of aid varies from country to counrty and is also sensitive to 
different policy regimes in operation. If the condsidered economy is 
backed up with， strong and sound policies coupled with political stablilty 
and other underlying factors presumed to be conductive to development， 
foreign aid shows some positive effects on those economies. Otherwise it 
has failed to act as a catalyst for economic development， underlining the 
importance of aid appraisal in a more qualitative approach， inthe context 
of cultural， institutional and policy background of individual economies. 
It can be again proclaimed that foreign aid is only one source of promot-
ing economic growth and developemnt， itmay be necessary for develop-
ment but not sufficient on its own. 
II. The Experience of Foreign Aid in Sri Lanka: An Overview 
With respect to economic policy， Sri Lanka has come almost ful 
circle in the five decades since political independence. The figure 1 
Figure1: ODA receipts to Sri Lanka in Different Policy Regimes (1 960-2002) 
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reflects that foreign aid receipts had fluctuated widely in respect to 
changes of the policies in the country during the last five decades. 1n the 
next section， these changes of ODA receipts to the country with respect 
to policy changes will be discussed in detail. 
From the Independence to 1955: 1n the early 1950s， the country followed 
liberal economic policies with litle direct government involvement in 
economic activity and with minimum interventions in foreign trade and 
exchange controls. The year 1951 saw the inauguration of the Colombo 
Plan for South and South-eastern Asia， after which， foreign aid became 
an important part of the Sri Lankan economy. But the amount of aid 
received at the initial phase was significantly small， partly due to the 
suspension of aid by the United states in 1953 as a consequence of Sri 
Lanka' rubber exports to the Peoples Republic of China. But in 1954 Sri 
Lanka was able to get its first project loan from the 1nternational Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (1BRD， generally referred to as the 
W orld Bank) for a Hydropower project. 1n 1955 Sri Lanka became a 
member of UN and signed an agreement with UN and its specialized 
agencies to obtain aid. As a result， inthe first half of the 1950s Sri Lanka 
obtained aid only from the western countries and international agencies. 
From 1956 to 1964: Political changes in 1956 commenced direct govern-
ment interventions and control over economic activity， transforming Sri 
Lanka basically into a semi…planned mixed economy. As the western 
donor countries did not encourage these policy changes， the government 
explored new aid sources. The new govemment established diplomatic 
relations with the socialist countries. Socialist countries such as USSIミ，
Czechoslovakia， provided financial aid as well as technical assistance for 
large number for industrial projects (see Table 1) in the state sector in 
this period. After 1958， project based bilateral assistance was received 
??
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mainly in the form of loans f1勾omvarious countries such as USSR， the UK， 
Canada and the Republic of Germany. With the inflow of aid from the 
socialist countries during 1960-64 the relative importance of the capitalist 
countries' aid declined. Furthermore， USA again suspended their aid 
programme to Sri Lanka on the ground that the country failed to provide 
compensation for the expropriation of the American oil companies. 
Foreign aid receipts in this first attempt of Import substitute lndustriali司
zation (ISI) Policy regime has increased compared to the prior to 1956 
period， but stil was very small (refer figure 1). According to the OECD 
data， inthe period 1960 -64 Sri Lanka has experience an average of US$ 
56.7 million annual ODA (refer Appendix Table 1)， which was about 0.71 
per cent of the country's GNI.“Although continuous balance of payment 
difficulties， and a resource gap in the proposed development plans urgent-
ly required external assistance， specifically international financial assis-
tance， negative attitude towards foreign aid， a deterioration of the rela-
tionship with western donor countr・ies，and semi-socialist ideologies may 
have prevented the receipts of foreign aid in this period" (Ratnayake， 
2004: 46). 
Table 1・1ndustrialProj巴ctsFunded by External Aid from the Socialist Countries 
Donor country Type of Industrial Project Year 
China Textil巴 1959 
Czechoslovakia Til巴， Textile， Sugar， L巴atherproducts 1956 
Tile 1956 
Fed巴ralRepublic of Ger-
Paper Board， Cast 1ron Foundry 1962 
many 
Cem巴nt 1967 
USSR 
1ron and Steel mill， Tyre and tube， Flour 
Milling 
1958 
Poland Hardware Factory 1963 
Source: Randeni， A.R.， 1975 
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From 1965 To 1969: In the 1965…69 1'egime， some st1'ategies we1'e unde1'句
taken fo1' pa1'tial libe1'alization of t1'ade mainly as a 1'ecommendation of 
the IBRD. Fo1'eign investments we1'e encou1'aged by va1'ious incentives. 
A dual exchange 1'ate system was int1'oduced with some devaluations of 
cur1'ency in o1'der to p1'omote expo1'ts and demote impo1'ts. These policy 
changes created a positive 1'esponse in donor community， thus the 1'ise of 
fo1'eign assistance t1'ansfen岨edto the country was nea1'ly fou1' times la1'ger 
on average compa1'ed to 1960-64 pe1'iod. The proportion of aid from the 
capitalist countries also inc1'eased. The total 1'eceipts in this regime (1965 
-69) account 1.96 pe1' cent of GNI (1'efe1' Table 2). According to Gunatila-
ke (200: 142， extracted fr勾omRatnayake， 2004: ，17) fo1'eign aid was inte-
grated into the economy as a c1'itical 1'esource available for maー
c1'oeconomic management and investment for development during this 
policy regime.“Fo1'eign assistance given in this pe1'iod was mo1'e substan-
tial in size and its net benefit to the balance of payment and the govern-
ment budget was higher than the p1'evious 1'egime. It cannot be denied 
that the count1'y was able to achieve successful economic perfo1'mance， 
even fo1' a sho1't period of time， as a consequence of sizeable foreign aid 
1'eceipts that resolved the balance of payment difficulties. It has been 
noted that nea1'ly 90 pe1' cent of these fo1'eign aid was 1'eceived as loans to 
be 1'epaid with inte1'est. In the p1'evious two policy 1'egimes loans com-
p1'ised only 63 per cent of fo1'eign aid" (Ratnayake， 2004: 47). 
From 1970 to 1977: By the ea1'ly 1970s， again the economy had become 
highly 1'egulated and cont1'olled. Inc1'ease of government involvement in 
economic activities increased the government expenditu1'e c1'eated a huge 
gap in government budg・et.The p1'ivate sector activities were restricted. 
Although these policies was not favo1'ed as a good development st1'ategy 
among donor community， fo1'eign aid receipts continues to flow. The 
county has heavily depended on fo1'eign capital during this policy regime 
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with an increase of foreign finance inflow of 42.85 per cent on average to 
the country.“This reveals that the country could not follow the unworka-
ble political ideology and had to seek foreign assistance to resolve serious 
macroeconomic imbalances and some acute socio-economic problems， 
which immerged during this period as a result of both domestic and 
foreign stress. Despite the high level of foreign aid inflow， itcan be 
argued that unlike the previous regime， the 1970-76 regime was able to 
minimize its foreign aid dependency， 1王eepingits loan rate about 64 per 
cent as compared to nearly 90 per cent in the previous regime， keeping its 
loan rate at about 64 per cent" (Ratnayake， 2004: 47). 
From 1977 Onwards: 1n 1977， a complete turnaround in the country's 
economic policy was initiated with the introduction of a market-oriented 
policy package of Export Oriented 1ndustrialization (EOI)， featuring the 
deregulation of market activities and the reduction of direct government 
participation in the economy. This was perceived by the capitalist 
countries as an opportunity to popularize open economic policies in the 
Asian region as oppose to the socialist policies. Thus Sri Lanka was able 
to mobilize a huge sum of foreign financial recourses during this phase. 
More than one third of the foreign aid in this period was received as 
grants， which the country is free from the obligation to repay. This 
period of 1977 to 1994 has experienced the highest receipts of foreign aid 
to the country with 12，484 million US$. The year 1978 denoted the highest 
ODA receipt ever to Sri Lanka with a remarkable 11.8 per cent of GN1 
(refer・AppendixTable 1). During the period 1978-1994， the country has 
received thrice as a much per year compared to 1970-1976 period. As 
J apan emerged as an economic super power in the Asian region， from late 
1980s she became the major donor country for Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has 
recognized the need for injection of foreign aid; financial， material or 
technical assistance， until the country is able to meet its own capital 
??
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needs. Today， Foreign aid has become a major powerful political good 
among the policy makers despite their ideological differences (Ratnaya-
ke， 2004: 48). 
Per匂dafter mid 1990s: Although the rates of increase of foreign aid 
receipts changes drastically in the above discussed different policy 
regimes of the country， the general trend of foreign aid receipts was 
positive. But a reverse trend was observed in the mid 1990s and into the 
new millennium. The average ODA receipt per annum was reduced by 
50.65 per cent compared to the 1977-1994 regimes. At this stage Sri 
Lanka was experiencing a per capita income of more than 873 US$5 ， 
which was not considered a poor economy anymore. So Sri Lanka was 
shifted down in the priority list of many donor countries. But with 
specific actions taken towards a sustainable peace process in 2002， the 
donor countries have acted positively. This has a gain an increase of 
international aid flows mainly form J apan， N orway and USA. But the 
increases of ODA receipts are mainly in the form of loans rather than 
grants (see figure 2). The figur・e2 also highlights the overriding impor-
tance of J apan since 1980s. 
Figure 2: Changes in Aid Receipts from the Main Donor Countries for Sri Lanka 
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Source: htp:/w¥Vw.oecd.OJ耳/dac/stats/idsonline 
5 According to the Human Developemnt ReQort 2002， the per capita GDP of Sri 
Lanka was 873 US$ in 2002. This was c1asified as a low巴rmiddle income country 
according to the wrold Bank c1assifications. 
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Table 2: Average ODA flows to Sri Lanka in Differ巴ntPolicy Regimes 
(US$ millionl 
TotalODA Average ODA 
A verage ODA per 
Regim巴
($ in millionsl 
annum as a 
per annum 
perc巴ntageof GNI 
1960-1964 227.13 56.78 0.71 
1965-1969 1002.42 200.48 l.96 
1970-1976 1913.32 273.33 2.80 
1977-1994 12484.76 693.60 8.32 
1995…2002 2737.88 342.24 2.54 
Note: GDP and GNP values available in the OECD database and Central Bank Annual Reports of Sri 
Lanka vary significantly. Here， the values are calculated using OECD data. Calculation using the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka anual report c1ata gives much lower percentages of ODA receipts 
Source: htp:/ww.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline 
From the foregoing account， itis clear that the primary reason for 
Sri Lanka's reliance on Foreign aid was the failure of the economy to 
sustain a pace of development. This was acute due to the decline of terms 
of trade of its major agricultural exports and growing population. The 
result has been a chronic imbalance in external payments (see figure 3). 
The policy makers in Sri Lanka expected that the transfer of financial 
aid and technology would eventually result in attainment of a self-sustain-
ing growth stage. The next section of this paper will discuss about the 
actual effect of these transfers of financial aid and technical assistance on 
some selected macroeconomic variables of Sri Lankan economy. 
Figure 3: External Resource Gap in SriしankanEconomy 
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IV. Impact of Foreign Aid on Sri Lankan Economy 
1n this study， macroeconomic variables were limited to three factors， 
(a) growth rate of GDP， (b) government expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP， and (c) domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. As discussed 
previously， growth rate of GDP was identified as one of the main objec-
tives of ODA itself. As per the two-gap model， ifthe funds received under 
ODA are utilized in appropriate investment projects effectively filling up 
the realized resource gap， itwas believed that the countries savings rate 
would improve. To assess this effect savings rate per GDP was identified 
as a key variable. Finally， most ODA are channeled through the govern-
ments of the recipient countries. ODA financed a major portion of 
government budget， apart from its tax and non-tax revenues. Thus how 
far can the government expenditure be influenced by this additional 
source of income， isan issue to be assessed. 1n this study a simple two 
variable analysis (using the Pearson correlation co-efficient) was used in 
order to identify the correlation within these variables and ODA. ODA 
was considered in three different time frames; ODA at curr・entyear， ODA 
lagged by one year and lagged by three yeal・s.Analyses were carried out 
for the total time period of 1960 to 2002 ancl then the performance 
Table 3: Sri Lanka's Average Savings Rate， GDP Growth Rat巴 andGovernment 
Expenditure in Different Policy Regimes 
Gov巴rnment
Averag巴SavingsRate GDP Growth Rate 
Regime 
(% of GDP) (%) 
Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
1960-1964 13.52 4.52 28.68 
1965-1969 12.32 4.84 28.14 
1970-1977 13.07 2.91 26.69 
1977-2000 14.73 4.98 30.78 
1960ω2000 14.01 4.55 29.50 
Source: Central BanlミofSri Lanka， Annual reports， various isues 
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differences in the two main policy periods; namely lSI (using data from 
1960 to 1976) and EOI (using data fr・om1977 to 2002) were compared 
Table 3 summarizes the savings rate， GDP Growth rate and the govern-
ment expenditure; al expressed as a percentage of GDP in different 
policy regimes. 
(a) Impact on Growth Rate of GDP 
As shown in table 4， the analysis indicates that the correlation of 
ODA as a percentage of GDP and growth rate of GDP for the period of 
1960 to 2002 is not significant in al three time frames. This is because the 
model only considers foreign aid as the dependent variable on GDP 
growth rate. As argued above， this implies that for・eignaid is only a 
minor variable effecting GDP growth rate of a country. Many other key 
factors play a much larger role in the country's economic performance 
than ODA. The correlation is also indicated to be positive revealing that 
although insignificance ODA has influenced economic growth in Sri 
Lanka to some extent. When considering the lSI policy regime (before 
1977)， itis interesting to see that the growth rate resulted a negative 
correlation with ODA as a percentage of GDP for current year. Thus in 
this per・iodthe ODA receipts has not been able to influence the growth 
rate of the economy as expected. 
The Import Substitute Industrialization policy adopted in most part 
of this period provided protection to local industries. Most of these 
industries， and industries funded through aid projects such as synthetic 
textile industry and tile industry， highly depended on import of both 
capital goods and intermediate inputs. The dependency of the economic 
growth on imports increased. With the deterioration of terms of trade for 
major plantation crops， which were the main exports of the economy at 
the time， the balance of payment situation worsened. Thus the country 
seems to have reached a stage beyond which no further growth is possible 
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without more foreign borrowings. 1nterestingly， the growth rate results 
a positive correlation when lagged for 1 year， but negative correlation 
when lagged for 3 years. ODA invested projects have created short term 
benefits. Since most of these were infrastructure development and indus-
trial projects， the benefits are expected to be realized only in the long run. 
The short run economic performances may be due to short run employ-
ment creations and economic activities aroused by the project activities. 
But after 1977 in the open economic policy regime， even though weak 
and not significant， ODA shows a positive correlation with the growth 
rate in al three-time frames. 1n this period， Sri Lanka followed policy 
packages recommended by western aid donors， and the donors provided 
the resources needed to implement the policy packages. Although GDP 
was increasing， the country was more and more depending on foreign aid 
to implement theses strategies. Therefore as GDP growth rate increases， 
the ODA inflows into the country also increased simultaneously. 
Table 4: Correlations of Growth Rate and GDP 
Current year Lagged by 1 y巴ar Lagged by 3 y日ars
0.197 0.240 0.040 
From 1960-2002 
(0.200) (0.121) (0.805) 
0.028 。.132 -0.034 
From 1960-1976 
(0.915) (0.613) (0.898) 
0.277 0.188 0.035 
From 1977-2002 
(0.171) (0.357) 
[ 
(0.872) 
N ote: Pearson co口elationvalues were calculated here. Pearson corelation value ranges from 1 to-1 
Values nearing these extremes indicate a stronger corelation bctween the considered variables‘ 
The significance values at 5 1冗rcnt eror margin are shoWJ1 within parenthesis. A value les than 
0.05 indicate a significant relationship 
(b) Impact on Government Expenditure 
The overall correlation with government expenditure and ODA， both 
variable expressed as a percentage of GDP， during 1960-2002 was highly 
significant and positively and strongly correlated in al three time frames 
??? ? ?
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(see Table 5). But when considering the period before 1977， this corrでla-
tion turns to be negative. For the open economic policy regime it's 
positive. This reveals that in the outward oriented policy regime govern同
ments are highly depending on foreign financial assistance than compared 
to inward looking policy regime. 
Table 5: CorreJations between Government Expenditure and ODA 
Current year Lagged by 1 year Lagged by 3 years I 
0.650 0.623 0.392 
From 1960-2002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
一0.400 -0.507 0.337 
From 1960-1976 
(0.112) (0.038) (0.186) 
0.732 0.781 0.035 
From 1977-2002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.872) 
L …ー
N ote: Pearson corelation values were calculated here. Pearson corclation value ranges from 1 to-}. 
Values nearing these extremes incIicate a stronger corelation beれNcenthe considered variables 
The significance values at 5 percent eror margin elre shown within parenthesis. A value les than 
0，05 inc1icate a significant relationship， 
The positive relationship is worthy， ifthe increased expenditur命eof 
the government is channeled for investments. But this is not to be the 
case in Sri Lanka. As illustrated by the table 6， although the government 
consumption has tend to decrease in the earlier decades by 22.4 per cent 
and then by 21.0 per cent (in 1960s' and 1070s' respectively)， in1990s it has 
increased by 18.7 per cent. But， simultaneous to this increase in govern悶
ment consumption， the investment expenditure has decreased by 30.5 per 
cent in 1990s. Therefore we cannot observe a corresponding increase of 
government investments， along with the increase in government expendi-
ture. 
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Table 6: Structur巴ofGovernment Expenditure of Sri Lanka 
(as a Percentage of GDP) 
Average Av日rage
% Change % Chang日
Periocl of of 
Consumption Investment 
Consumption Investments 
1960-1969 13.6 4.9 -22.4 13.6 
1970…1979 10.6 5.6 
-21.0 -8.9 
1980-1989 8.4 5.1 
1990-1999 9.9 3.5 18.7 一30.5
Before 1977 12.7 5.1 
-27.4 -11.3 
After 1977 9.2 4.5 
Source: Central Bank Annual report， variOlS islIcs 
(c) Impact on Domestic Savings Rate 
The findings here are in favor of the argument by many researchers 
that ODA is negatively associated with savings. This analysis also 
showed an overall negative corrモlationwith savings per GDP and ODA 
per GDP fo1' al th1'ee time f1'ames (1・eferTable 7). 1n the inward oriented 
policy 1'egime， when ODA is lagged for one year and th1'ee years， itresults 
a positive correlation with domestic savings， but neither significant no1' 
strong. Even though the possibility of receiving an additional source of 
revenue in te1'ms of fo1'eign finance has inc1'easecl the consumption result-
ing a negative correlation with ODA at the consider・edpoint of time， inthe 
meclium 1'un， that ODA has 1'esultecl in an inc1'ease in clomestic savings to 
some extent. But in the outwa1・d01・ienteclpolicy regime， negative associeト
tions for al th1'ee time f1'ames were obse1'vecl， implying that ODA is not 
actually supplementing the resource gap in the S1'i Lankan economy. 
Existence of a 1'eliable external source of finance has actually actecl as a 
discouraging factor for clomestic savings. 
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Table 7: Correlations between Dom巴sticSavings rat巴andODA 
Current year Lagged by 1 year Lagged by 3 years 
一0.275 0.167 匂0.154
From 1060-2002 
(0.071) (0.284) (0.337) 
…0.184 0.288 0.314 
From 1960-1976 
(0.480) (0.263) (0.219) 
0.534 -0.556 同0.615
From 1977-2002 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) 
Note: Pearson corelation values were calculated here. Pearson corelation value ranges from 1 to.1 
Values nearing these extremes indicate a stronger corelation between the considered variables 
The significance values at 5 per cent eror margin are shown within parenthesis. A value les than 
0，05 indicate a significant relationship 
Why is the country experiencing a negative effect of ODA on its 
savings while having a minute， but positive effect on its growth? One 
argument is that Sri Lanka is at present experiencing such a debt bl.rden， 
that there is very little net gain of ODA into the country. As shown in 
table 8， most of the ODA received is siphoned 01.lt of the country as debt 
repayments. Even though the received ODA may have been l.tilized for 
designated investment projects sl.pplementing the foreign exchange 
resource gap experienced in the country， ithas failed to enhance the 
savings as suggested by the two-gap theory. Domestic savings， or in 
other words， surpll.s earnings of the cOl.ntry designate to be saved， ml.st 
be utilized for debt services of earlier ODAs. The greater the cOl.ntry is 
receiving foreign assistance， the greater the country's debt bl.rden will be， 
res1.l1ting further and fl.rther reduction in domestic savings. Despite the 
fact that ODA has some positive effect on the growth rate of the econ-
omy， evidently the economic growth rate has been highly insufficient. 
The country has been unable to generate enough of an income to face the 
cost of finance. In spite of the positive correlation， ODA has failed to 
generate a jl.stifiable rate of growth in the economy. This phenomenon 
has been amplified by the depreciation of Rupee against the J apanese Yen 
and US Dollar. As the amount of foreign debt denominates in Japanese 
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yen and US$， the higher rate of depreciation of the Rupee against these 
two currencies increases the Rupee value of debt significantly. According 
to the Central Bank Annual Report 2003 (2003; 184) the Rupee value of 
foreign debt held in US$ and J apanese Yen (34 per cent and 41 per cent， 
respectively) was increased by 12.7 per cent and 10.1 per cent， respective-
ly in 2003 due to depreciation of the Sri Lankan Rupee. 
Table 8: Ext巴malDebt Indicators in Sri Lanka 
Total D巴bt'a)
As a percentage of GDP 
D日btService Ratio(b) 
a: lncludes Monetary Authorities， Government and Commercial banks (in US$ milion) 
b: As a percentage of earnings from mechandise exports and services 
Source: EconomIC Progres of lndependent Sri Lanka， 198; Central Bank of Sri Lanka， 2003 
There are several reasons why immense tr羽 1sfersfrom the donor 
communities have not led to a similar transfer of prosperity. Donor 
countries while giving advise on policy reforms， also did not have a 
perfect vision of development. Aid was lent mainly to the government， 
supporting central planning. ODA have helped expand the state sector at 
the expense of the private sector in the country. Foreign aid has financed 
inefficient state managed industries， and enabled the government to run 
with a huge budget deficit. Thoroughly politicized development planning 
and power of economic decision making in the hands of political author-
ities has meant that a substantial amount of countries' otherwise useful 
resources has been diverted to infertile activities such as politically 
motivated spending by the state. 
On the other hand， with a long history of ODA receipt to the country， 
the political and administrative system of the country has ended Up with 
the aid ependency syndrome. As argued in the 1987 Sri Lanka Paris Aid 
Consortium Meeting Report，“Aid has become Sri Lanka's Largest source 
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of foreign exchange since 1981". the report has concluded that“the 
economy (of Sri Lanka) has become structurally dependent on foreign 
aid". An average of 3.27 per cent of a country's GN1 per annum for nearly 
5 decades， specially an 8.32 per cent of GN1 for nealry 16 years represents 
a significant portion of income for any nation. 1n order to finance the 
government net cash deficits， al consecutive governments were heavily 
depending on foreign finance， mostly consist of consessional loans (see 
table 9). Except in 1990 and 2000 foreign borrowings has increase by a 
greater percentage than domestic borrowings. 
Table 9: Financing of the Budget Deficit (US$ in million) 
Total Domestic 
Changein 
For日ign Incr日as巴ofForeign 
Year 。om日stic
BOlTowings (a) 
Borrowings (%) 
Finance(b) Borrowings (%) 
1971/72 182.1 59.7 
1975 193.9 6.5 101.8 70.5 
1980 526.8 171. 7 371.2 264.7 
1985 400.0 -24.1 383.5 3.3 
1990 1209.8 202.4 457.9 19‘4 
1995 662.3 -45.3 649.3 41.8 
2000 1563.8 136.1 121.8 -81.2 
2002 1320.8 -15.5 179.7 47.5 
(a) inclidεs loans， treasury bils， bonds， borrowings from banks and cash balancε 
from previose y巴ar
(b) includes project and non project loans and grants 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka， various issues 
V. Concluding Remarks 
As concluded by many researchers， this sudy also reveals that ODA 
so far has not made any significant effect on the economic performance 
of Sri Lanka. 1t has assisted the country towards progress to some 
?
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extent， but substandard compared with its receipts and cost of the 
receipts. Because of this and many other reasons it has resulted a dwindle 
in the countries savings rate， and through highly fungible institutional 
framework has supported a highly politicized economic system. 
But in this study a very simple two variable models are used. 
Although they are effective in simple analysis in order to evaluate the 
correlation of some macro variables and foreign aid， itis not sufficient to 
capture the dynamic aspects of foreign aid. Apart form the fact that the 
countries economy is not static， also those macroeconomic variables also 
can have a vise versa effect on foreign aid， thus a multipleir effect on 
growth. These aspects are not captured in the above models. Thus， there 
is an opening to employ an empirical dynamic model to evaluate the 
effects of ODA in the economy of Sri Lanka， ifthe objectives of donor and 
recipient are to be realized in the future. It must be also kept in mind that 
having no siginificant effect at the macrolevel of the economy do not 
necessarily say that ODA is a total failure. はanyof the foreign assis-
tance received were in terms of technical assistance or for subjects such 
as infrastructure development， even thought important， are not direct 
contributors to the expansion GDP. Thus， they may not be tracable at the 
macrolevel. Therefore more extensive microlevel analysis may result in 
a beUer understanding of the situation. 
It is clear that as long as the circumstances for economic develop-
ment do not exist in the country， no quantity of foreign aid will be able 
to produce economic growth. Besides， economic growth in poor countries 
does not necessarily depend on official transfers from outside sources. 
The long-held perception of foreign assistance that some countries are 
poor because they lacked capital has overlooked many of the other non 
-economic factors that contribute to the process of development. Thus 
the result has also contradicted many theories and resulted in the accumu句
lation of massive debt， on the place of development. 
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Appendix Table 1: ODA Receipts by Sri Lanka from All Donor Countries (1960-2003) 
ODA ODA 
Year 
TotaIODA* ODA as % 1、otaIODA* ODA as % per Capita* Year per Capita* ($ MiIlion) of GNI* ($ Million) of GNI* (事) ($) 
1960 10.53 1.09 0.706 1982 415.43 27.72 8.625 
1961 10.69 1.07 0.716 1983 470.78 31.05 9.156 
1962 12.28 1.20 0.788 1984 456.93 29.82 7.782 
1963 10.01 0.96 0.617 1985 468.26 30.26 7.866 
1964 7.88 0.73 0.455 1986 547.92 35.06 8.588 I 
1965 13.67 1.24 0.765 1987 476.99 30.22 
1966 27.48 2.44 1.480 1988 634.84 39.82 
1967 44.26 3.84 2.248 1989 620.30 38‘52 
1968 54.02 4.58 2.875 1990 729.83 44.87 9.278 
1969 49.99 4.15 2.411 1991 890.84 54.16 10.098 
1970 49.24 4.00 2.180 1992 641.74 38.59 6.736 
1971 55.86 4.45 2.391 1993 662.93 39.34 6.490 
1972 57.92 4.52 2.295 1994 601.68 35.19 5.209 
1973 58.03 4.45 2.039 1995 555.09 32.12 4.305 
1974 80.75 6.08 2.277 1996 486.63 27.82 3.554 
1975 152.83 11.31 4.059 1997 331.18 18.71 2.218 
1976 155.06 11.29 4.356 1998 425.09 23.70 2.722 
1977 187.45 13.42 4.598 1999 263.16 14.45 1.708 
1978 323.99 22.85 11.916 2000 276.29 14.96 1.727 
1979 322.70 22.42 9.636 2001 312.77 16.70 1.951 
1980 389.59 26.68 9.745 2002 344.02 18.10 2.137 
1981 377.22 25.49 8.734 2003 671.90 35.01 2.980 
ホSOlrce:http://www.oecd 目立/dac/sta臼/idsonline
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